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GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE
REGULATION IN BANK INSOLVENCY CASES
INTRODUCTION
The record of recent bank failures and near failures
reveals that the regulatory structure of bank agencies is
defective and unless that structure is recast, there is vir-
tually no hope that the regulatory apparatus will be cap-
able of insuring a safe and sound banking system. Contin-
uation of the present supervisory structure will make it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to correct the defi-
ciencies in banking practices which have cropped up in
recent years. Confidence in the Nation's banking system
cannot be maintained in this helter-skelter regulatory
atmosphere ....
The decade of the 1970's was one of the most tumultuous
in banking history. All aspects of the industry were severely
strained and tested. One symptom of the period was the dra-
matic rise in the number of bank insolvencies and problem
banks.' The recent rash of bank failures peaked in 1976 when
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1. Compendium of Major Issues in Bank Regulation: Comm'n on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Seas. vii (1975) (foreword
by Chairman W. Proxmire).
2. Problem banks are typically defined as banks which require special supervi-
sory attention by regulatory agencies. Usually, such classification is the result of a
bank's having an excess amount of classified assets (outstanding loans which are of
questionable status with respect to repayment), being undercapitalized, or in danger
of having its viability impaired for some reason. The FDIC and FRS typically use the
term "problem banks" for all banks under their supervision which necessitate special
attention. The Comptroller General suggests that the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) only considers problem banks as a portion of banks requiring special
supervisory attention. This article will follow the general FDIC/FRS usage. U.S.
Comp. GaN. Highlights of a Study of Federal Supervision of State and National
Banks: Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the U.S. 1 (1977).
The methodology used in evaluating assets and banks is complicated. In bank
examinations, bank assets are classified either as "substandard," "doubtful," or
"loss." Substandard assets "are characterized by the distinct possibility that the bank
will sustain some loss if deficiencies of the obligor or collateral pledged are not cor-
rected." A doubtful asset is one step worse than a substandard asset: the deficiency
makes collection or liquidation in full "highly questionable or improbable." A loss is
an asset considered virtually uncollectible, one which should be charged off the bal-
ance sheet even though partial recovery may be possible in the future. In computing
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thirty-two banks closed or were absorbed by other banks in
order to avert closings.8 After an economic upturn and respite
from bank failures in 1977 and 1978, 1980 began on a decided
the net sound capital of a bank, examiners write-off fifty percent of the total doubtful
assets and all of the loss assets. The proportion of adversely-classified assets is then
used to help determine whether a bank should be classified as a problem bank. An-
nouncements: Revision In Bank Examination Procedures, 65 FED. RES. BULL. 406,
407 (May 1979). For an in-depth discussion of the methodology used in examinations,
see Sinkey, Problem Banks: Identification and Characteristics, 1975 J. OF BANK RE-
SEARCH 208. See also Sinkey, Bank Capital, Loan Evaluations, and Problem Banks,
FDIC WORKING PAPER No. 76-2; Sinkey, The Way Problem Banks Perform, THE
BANKERS MAG., Autumn 1974, at 40; Sinkey, Identifying Large Problem/Failed
Banks: The Case of Franklin National Bank of New York, 12 J. OF FINANCIAL AND
QUANTATIVE ANALYSIS 779 (1977).
Statistics on bank insolvencies and problem banks are very difficult to ascertain
and compile. The bank regulatory agencies refuse to disclose many of these statistics,
especially the "problem bank lists," that is, the names of banks which are more care-
fully supervised because of their impaired and risky status. Non-disclosure is essen-
tially posited upon the assumption that disclosure would undermine public confi-
dence in banks and the banking system and would inhibit the regulators' efforts to
save the endangered banks. The absence of disclosure could and has caused unknow-
ing and innocent people to be injured financially. See Leff, How Secret Should Bank
Problem Lists Be?, 161 THE BANKERS MAO., Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 37.
Of great concern is the fact that all of the ten largest banking failures in U.S.
banking history have occurred since 1966 and, of those, the top eight have occurred
since 1973. Sinkey, Identifying Large Problem/Failed Banks, supra at 780. The larg-
est failure was the Franklin National Bank of New York which had $1.5 billion in
deposits when it closed in 1974. Another growing concern is the fact that the regula-
tory agencies have reported a rising trend of problem banks. There are essentially
three federal agencies which compile these statistics: Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal Re-
serve System (FRS). In 1973, the OCC reported 79 problem banks, banks holding 2.6
percent of the total deposits of all national banks. By 1976, this total had risen to 275
banks holding $200 billion in deposits or 42 percent of all national bank deposits.
COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, ADEQUACY OF THE OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER
OF THE CURRENCY'S SUPERVISION OF FRANKLIN NATIONAL BANK, REP. No. 32, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976). Similarly, the FDIC reported a rise from 349 problem banks
($20 billion deposits) in 1975 to 368 banks ($61 billion deposits) at the end of 1977.
Second Meeting on the Condition of the Banking System: Hearings Before the
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Seas.
292-96 (1978). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (hereinafter FHLBB) has re-
ported similar increases. Even some of the nation's largest and most well-known
banks, Citibank and Chase Manhattan, have appeared on the problem bank lists in
the last several years. Washington Post, Jan. 11, 1976, at 1, col. 1; Sinkey, Identifying
Large Problem/Failed Banks, supra at 779-80. Due to the secrecy of problem bank
lists (see note 1 supra), the Post disclosures were actually derived from governmental
information leaks.
3. See First Meeting on the Condition of the Banking System: Hearings Before
the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 794-811 (1977); Second Meeting on the Condition of the Banking System:
Hearings Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 132 (1978).
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downbeat amidst renewed fears of bank failures. John G. Hei-
mann, United States Comptroller of the Currency, has warned
that some large banks may fail as a result of extremely taut
political, economic, and banking conditions.4 The potential is
clear. As recession deepens, many weaker banks could fail.'
4. Addressing the annual convention of the American Bankers Association on
October 8, 1979, Heimann warned that as a result of extremely taut conditions, regu-
lators "should prepare for unanticipated shocks, such as the Franklin National Bank
failure (in 1974), which if mishandled could fundamentally shake confidence and un-
dermine" the banking system. Foldessy, Nation Should Get Ready for the Failures of
Some Large Banks, U.S. Official Says, Wall St. J., Oct. 9, 1979, at 3, col. 6.
Many bankers and economists assailed Heimann's warning initially. Several
months later, more and more experts echoed Heimann's warnings. See Foldessy, Cap-
ital Concern: Many Banks Now Face Their Biggest Problems Since 73-75 Reces-
sion, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1980, at 1, col. 6. Essentially, the fear is that continuing
inflation, high costs of money to banks and savings and loans (much of which is being
borrowed by them to cover money loaned out at much lower rates), unprecedented
levels of consumer debt, OPEC actions, the instability of foreign nations with large
outstanding loans, the Iranian Crisis, and simple overextension by banks will so im-
pair many banks' financial condition that they will fail. The capitalization of many
banks today is worse than it was in 1974, the worst year of the last recession. "Capital
(basically the excess of a bank's assets over its liabilities) is the final cushion for
banks to absorb unexpected losses." Id. At the end of 1974, each dollar of capital
supported on the average $21.25 of loans and other assets at each of the nation's 15
largest banks. At the end of 1978, this had risen to an average of $23.75. Some banks
had ratios far in excess of the average (e.g., $71.43 at Detroit's Bank of Common-
wealth and $32.26 at First Pennsylvania Corporation of Philadephia). Hence, if many
loans are defaulted upon, banks will fail. See Announcements: Uniform Examination
Procedure, 64 FED. Rus. BuLL. 920 (Nov. 1978); Facing the Challenges Ahead, speech
by Jan Janis, Chairman of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, made to the Florida
Savings and Loan League, released in Fan. HomB LOAN BANK BOARD Naws, Sept. 24,
1979; Concern Rises Over Third World Loans, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Feb. 18,
1980, at 93; Hyatt, A Losing Gamble: Some Banks, S & Ls Suffer Financial Woes
Because They Bet Wrong on Lower Rates, Wall St. J., Feb. 6, 1979, at 38, col. 1;
Levine, Risky Maneuvers? Bank-Account Moves By. Iran, U.S. Are Seen Setting Bad
Precedents, Wall St. J., Nov. 15, 1979, at 1, col. 6; Janssen, Troubled Thrifts: Slumps
Usually Help Savings Institutions-But Not This Time, Wall St. J., Oct. 17, 1979, at
1, col. 1.
5. Much has been written about the potential of a recession in 1979-80. See,
e.g., Moor and Kristiansen, The Touch-and-Go Recession of 1979-80, A.G. BECKER/
EcONOMIC CouMNTS, Feb. 9, 1979; A Recession Check-Off: The Fourth Quarter
1979, A. G. BECKER/ECONOMIC CoMmENTs, Jan. 23, 1980; Barke, Still Strong, FRB SF
WEEKLY LErr, Dec. 28, 1979; Clark, After the Slump: Analysts Say Upturn Will
Be Slow and Weak When Recession Ends, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1980, at 1, col. 6.
In late 1979 and early 1980, rising interest rates caused problems at banks and
savings and loans which had speculated that rates would fall rather than rise. In an-
ticipation of a drop in interest rates, many financial institutions had committed
themselves to buy high-yielding securities. As interest rates rose the prices of the
securities (typically bonds) dropped in price turning anticipated profits into losses.
Some of these institutions had made commitments which exceeded their own net
worth. Until early 1979, regulators had uncovered over 40 cases of "worrisome specu-
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Typically, many parties including depositors, sharehold-
ers, creditors, borrowers, employees, communities, and gov-
ernmental agencies are adversely affected by a failure. At the
very worst, a chain of failures could precipitate an economic
crisis, similar to that of the early 1930's. The role of the regu-
lator in this process is complex, for he must balance the inter-
ests of all parties when dealing with problem banks and
failures.
To date the role of the courts in the regulation of
financial institutions has been limited. Typically, courts serve
as one-shot administrators, judging the fairness of settlement
terms in an insolvency case7 , and then approving or disap-
proving them. The fall-out litigation from recent large fail-
ures, however, has raised an old problem in a new context:
Can a regulator be held liable for negligence, error, or misfea-
sance in performance of his regulatory function? The purpose
lation." Further rate rises would compound the situation. Hyatt, Some Banks, S&Ls
Suffer Financial Woes Because They Bet Wrong on Lower Rates, Wall St. J., Feb. 6,
1979, at 38.
6. The FDIC and similar government sponsored organizations (FSLIC, the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and NCUA, the National Credit Union
Administrator) insure deposits at banks, savings and loans, and credit unions. Such
insurance is currently limited to $40,000 per account under the Federal Deposit In-
surance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811, 1813(m), 1821(a), (f) (1976). Under § 1821(f), the
FDIC, when a bank fails, must pay off each insured depositor in cash or by arranging
another bank's take-over of the failed bank's accounts.
The insurance pool maintained by the FDIC, though, represents only one percent
(1%) of total deposits in insured banks. Currently, the insurance fund is about $9
billion in size. The FDIC is also authorized to borrow $3 billion from the Treasury
Department should the FDIC's fund be exhausted. 12 U.S.C. § 1824 (1976). Hence,
currently, in a rash of failures the FDIC would have a total of $12 billion to cover a
total of $961 billion in deposits. Table 1.26, 65 FED. REs. BULL. A18 (Dec. 1979). The
failure of only a few of the largest banks could disrupt the entire deposit insurance
system, a contingency for which no preparation has been made legislatively. Presuma-
bly, all deposits beyond $12 billion would be uninsured and lost for their owners.
Aside from the theoretical danger of exceeding insurance fund coverage, many
depositors (especially corporations) have deposits in excess of the insurance limit of
$40,000. For example, when the United States National Bank of San Diego failed in
1973 over $300 million of the $930 million on deposit with the bank were uninsured.
First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361, 1365 (9th Cir. 1978). Had the FDIC been
unable to arrange a take-over by another bank, the depositors of $300 million would
have been creditors of the bank and could have lost all their money. See generally
Leff, supra note 2.
7. The court's administrative function and its historical basis was well deline-
ated in In re Home Nat'l Bank of Ellenville, 147 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The
case was cited with approval in In re Franklin Nat'l Bank, 381 F. Supp. 1390, 1393
(E.D.N.Y. 1974). However, in Ellenville, the judge expressed personal reservations
about courts assuming such administrative roles.
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of this comment is to analyze the recent series of cases in this
area and their precedential value. It argues that, in the ab-
sence of any immediate control of the bank regulators, the
courts should be allowed to pierce the veil of governmental
immunity presently protecting the agencies and their
functionaries.
OVERVIEW AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The Web of Regulation
Speaking of banking regulation, Representative Henry S.
Reuss, Chairman of the House Banking, Currency and Hous-
ing Committee, once called it a "seamless web." He also
quoted former Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur F. Burns,
stating that bank regulation is a " 'jurisdictional tangle that
boggles the mind' "-one which essentially is a "'competition
in laxity.' " The recent problems in banking have caused
Congress and many commentators to advocate reform.'0
Much of the problem stems from the fact that the scheme
of regulation evolved over the last one hundred fifty years
without a unifying basis or plan. Our present system consists
of a dual structure of state and federal regulation." Underly-
ing a federal scheme of control, supervision, and insurance is a
scheme of chartering, lesser controls, and supervision.
For commercial banks, four systems of regulation 5 are
possible: 1) national banks, federally chartered by the Office
8. The Drive for Sweeping Financial Reform, Bus. WEEK, May 26, 1975, at 83.
9. Remarks of Rep. Henry S. Reuss (D-Wis.) at the School of Banking of the
South (May 26, 1975) (copy on file at the Santa Clara Law Review).
10. See Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641, which amends many sections of 12 U.S.C. See
also Consolidated Banking Regulation Act of 1978: Joint Hearings Before the
Comm. on Gov. Affairs and the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
U.S. Senate, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975); Banking in Transition-Great Issues in
Banking Today, 161 THE BANKERS MAO. Sept.-Oct. 1978, at 21; Mayne, Restructur-
ing the Federal Bank Regulatory System, 161 THE BANKERS MAG. Sept-Oct. 1978, at
70; Davis, Reorganizing the Federal Banking Supervision, 162 THE BANKERS MAG.
Jan. 1979, at 72; Dince, The Bank Regulators Have a New Point of View, FORTUNE
Oct. 8, 1979, at 166. Finally, almost all other hearings and reports cited in this com-
ment deal with reform in some manner.
11. Much more comprehensive discussions and descriptions may be found in
Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN.
L. REv. 1 (1977); Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System (pts. 1 & 2), 52 VA. L. REv.
565, 771 (1966).
12. Scott, supra note 11, at 3.
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of the Comptroller of the Currency and automatically mem-
bers of the FDIC and the Federal Reserve System (FRS);8 2)
state chartered banks subscribing to the FRS and conse-
quently the FDIC;" 3) state chartered banks choosing to skip
the FRS while retaining the FDIC coverage;15 4) state
chartered banks functioning without federal insurance or FRS
membership.16 Similar schemes are found in savings and loan
association regulation.37 Finally, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) oversees all publicly owned banks and sav-
ings and loan associations.16
On the federal level, then, the OCC generally serves as
the overseer of the national banks. The FRS, through its
Board of Governors, serves to supervise its member banks and
to formulate and implement monetary policy. Finally, the
FDIC enjoys the broadest power in that it typically acts as
insurer of many of the nation's banks and, when a bank under
its jurisdiction fails, it acts as receiver.19
The Evolution of Bank Regulation
To more fully consider the question of liability of bank
regulators, it is necessary to have a perspective on the devel-
opment of regulation, its objectives and philosophies.'0 Our
13. As of June 30, 1978 there were 14,698 commercial banks. 5,621 of these were
FRS members, of which 4,616 were national banks. The national banks' assets repre-
sented 55% of all commercial bank assets. 64 FED. RES. BULL., Dec. 1978, at A17-19.
Later statistics are available, however the dates of the various financial statements
are inconsistent. See 65 FED. RES. BULL., Dec. 1979, at A16-19.
14. 1005 state chartered member banks' assets represented 18% of all commer-
cial banks' assets. 64 FED. RES. BULL, supra note 13, at A17.
15. The 8,760 FDIC insured non-member banks represented 21% of all com-
mercial banks' assets. Id.
16. Although the lack of FDIC insurance coverage would seem to be a disadvan-
tage competitively, the number of non-insured banks has been rapidly increasing. At
the end of 1975 only 253 banks, representing 1% of all commercial banks' assets, had
chosen to be noninsured non-FRS member banks. 62 FED. REs. BULL., Dec. 1976, at
A14. By June 1978, this group had grown to 317 banks holding 3.5% of all commer-
cial banks' assets. 64 FED. R S. BULL., supra note 13, at A17-19.
17. Mutual savings banks, located primarily in New England, have no federal
regulatory patterns although many adopt coverage by the Federal Savings & Loan
Insurance Corporation or FDIC.
18. The SEC is requiring greater and greater disclosure from banks, contrary to
the bank regulators policies. See Dince, supra note 10.
19. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1822 (1976).
20. See R. ROBINSON, THE CoMPTROLLER AND BANK SUPERVISION, A HIsTORucAL
APPRAISAL (1968) for a long but thorough discussion of this area from the OCC
perspective.
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modern banking system got its start in 1782 with the estab-
lishment of the Bank of North America. Initially, the growth
of banking was slow.2 However, in 1837, the Supreme Court
opened the path for more banks by holding that states had
the right to charter banks.2 2 One year later, New York fol-
lowed up the Supreme Court action by enacting a "Free
Banking Act"28 that permitted the formation of banks subject
only to certain requirements. Most importantly, a legislative
act was no longer required to establish each new bank. Other
states followed suit and the number of state banks more than
doubled from 1836 to 1863.24
The federal government, in an effort to finance the Civil
War, enacted the National Currency Act in 1863.25 This Act
designated a new federal office, the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC), which originally served to supervise
the establishment of a national currency. More importantly,
the Act established the principle of free banking on the na-
tional level. Implicit in the free banking principle were three
major public policy objectives, "[P]revention of undue concen-
tration of economic power, protection against banking insta-
bility, and creating a system of Federally chartered and regu-
lated banks.'" 26 Originally, a presumption underlying these
objectives was that banking regulation was allowed only to the
extent necessary to insure sound banking,27 but as the system
of federal banks evolved, so did the regulator's power. Subse-
quent economic crises further altered the emphasis of the
original National Banking Act.
Financial panics in the 1890's and in 1907 led to the en-
actment of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913.28 The Act estab-
lished the Federal Reserve System requiring each national
21. Chartering at that time required a legislative enactment, thus making entry
into the banking market difficult. The lack of a unified currency and the concept of
deposit banking (mostly banks operated by issuing notes) also dampened growth.
22. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. 257 (11 Pet.) (1837).
23. Free Banking Act, 1838 N.Y. Laws ch. 260.
24. 713 state banks existed in 1836; 1466 in 1863. Hackley, supra note 11, at 570
n.19.
25. The original act was revised and enacted as the National Bank Act in 1864.
National Banking Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864).
26. Study of the OCC, B-4 (May, 1975) (prepared by the accounting firm, Has-
kins and Sells) (on file at the Santa Clara Law Review).
27. Id. at B-7.
28. Ch. 6, 38 Stat. 51 (1913) (codified in 31 U.S.C. § 409 and scattered sections
of 12 U.S.C.).
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bank to join the system in order to support twelve regional
Federal Reserve Banks. The FRS had three stated objectives:
1) to circulate a new form of currency, Federal Reserve Notes;
2) to provide an agency where member banks could rediscount
commercial paper; and 3) "to establish a more effective super-
vision of banking." 9 Basically, the FRS was to function as a
central bank.
Establishing the FRS buoyed the banking system tempo-
rarily, but banking practices and bank failures in the 1920's
and 1930's produced a clamor for more supervision and regu-
lation.30 The concept of true competition in the banking in-
dustry faded as the government imposed controls on bank en-
try, deposit interest rates, and other bank activities. 1
Compared to the pre-Depression regulation, the post-Depres-
sion era was characterized by extreme conservatism. Regula-
tory conservatism arose in the wake of the Depression then
waned gradually. By the 1960's, Congress was again seeking to
stimulate competition in banking" even though it maintained
a more pervasive system of regulation than that contained in
the 1863 Act." This was necessary in light of the fact that
banking in general and assets in particular were becoming
more concentrated. Nonetheless, the period of aggressive bank
management and risk-taking in the late 1960's and early
1970's proved to be short-lived. The advent of branch bank-
ing, electronic fund transfers, concerns about privacy, and re-
cent bank failures have prompted a great deal of legislative
interest in restructuring and tightening the reins of control
again. This tightening is evident in the Financial Institutions
29. Ch. 6, § 1, 38 Stat. 251.
30. The 1920's saw a period of rapid growth and involvement in speculative
ventures. Combined with the still relatively "free" bank structure many banks were
formed and promptly failed as a result of poor management, too rapid growth, under-
capitalization, and the like. An overwhelming proportion of these failures were of
small, individual, midwestern banks. For example, 79.1% of the failures occurred in
towns with less than 2500 residents. Compendium supra note 1, at 542. In 1920 there
were 30,921 banks of all types (national and state). Between 1920 and 1929, 5411
banks failed. In 1930, 23,679 banks remained with 3,505 failing in 1930 and 1931. Id.
at 542-49.
31. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 12, 15, & 39 U.S.C.).
32. The number of banks in the country ebbed to a low of 13,140 banks in 1960.
By 1970, this number had grown to 13,678. It now stands at about 15,000. Compen-
dium, supra note 1, at 347.
33. See Study of the OCC, aupra note 26.
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Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 (FIRA)."
FIRA is an omnibus provision that was passed in the clos-
ing minutes of the Ninety-Fifth Congress in October 1978.
Generally, FIRA clarifies and sharpens the guidelines for
identifying both sound and unsafe banking practices.3 5 Title I
of FIRA toughens the regulatory powers of the OCC, FRS,
and FDIC. For example, under FIRA, the agencies now have
the power to issue cease and desist orders, levy fines of up to
$1000 a day, and remove bank officials and employees. 6
Title VIII of FIRA seeks to regulate insider transactions
and to prevent the abuse of correspondent banking.37 Consid-
ering that many bank insolvencies are caused by insider
abuses, this provision potentially may be the most effective
measure in the Act. As detailed below, however, efficient and
proper use of regulatory power remains an ideal. Congress, in
FIRA, gave the regulators great power but did little to en-
courage improvement of the regulators' efficiency and record
of success.
FIRA prevents interlocking directorates and manage-
ments of financial depository institutions (commercial banks,
savings banks, savings and loans, and credit unions).3 8 It also
provides for a bank regulatory oversight council,3 9 government
34. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978
(FIRA), Pub. L. No. 95-630, § 2, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978).
35. In past legislation, the finer aspects of defining unsafe and unsound were
left to be defined by banks, banking associations, and bank examiners.
36. Title I is a series of amendments to previous acts. It provides, inter alia,
that agencies may issue cease and desist orders for anticipated, as well as past and
present violations or unsafe and unsound banking practices. The orders may be ap-
plied directly to the violator or instigator, including the bank, its directors, officers,
employees, agents, or anyone involved in the bank's affairs. FIRA's Title I also pro-
vides for tough civil penalties. Violators may be fined up to $1000 per day for viola-
tions. A third enforcement device is especially tough. An agency or regulator has the
power to remove a violator upon a finding of dishonesty, breach of fiduciary duty,
disregard for the bank's soundness and safety, and even unfitness for management of
a bank. Suspension is possible, especially while the agency completes an investigation
to help decide whether to make a suspension a permanent removal. Of course, all of
these steps are accompanied by due process provisions.
Finally, the FRS is empowered to order sale, liquidation, or divestiture of a non-
bank subsidiary of a bank holding company where such a subsidiary seriously impairs
the safeness, stability, or soundness of its parent holding company. FIRA, 92 Stat.
3641-72.
37. Id. 3690-93.
38. Id. at 3672-75.
39. Id. at 3694-96.
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approval or disapproval of bank acquisitions, 0 protection
against financial privacy,41 and electronic fund transfer
regulations.4
Given the government's ever increasing presence in the
banking industry, an important issue arises: Precisely what
are the government's duties and liabilities? Arguably, the gov-
ernment owes a duty and is liable to everyone for the mainte-
nance of a safe and viable banking system. The concern of
this comment is narrower, liability of the regulators vis 6 vis a
bank's depositors, borrowers, creditors, and shareholders. This
requires consideration of the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
the Federal Tort Claims Act, and related case law.
THE QUESTION OF LIABILITY
Aware of the government's increasingly pervasive regula-
tion of banking and the growing strength of the bank regula-
tors, one wonders who is responsible when the regulators act
negligently, make a mistake, or are misfeasant. As detailed be-
low, the Federal Tort Claims Act,' 3 while lifting the veil of
general government immunity,4" has exceptions that cover
otherwise culpable bank regulators.
Federal Tort Claims Act
Prior to enactment in 1946 of the Federal Tort Claims
Act (FTCA), a claimant had little recourse against the govern-
ment for tortious wrongs. Since the federal government had
not given general consent to be sued for the tortious acts of its
agents, a claimant had to seek specific, private congressional
40. Id. at 3683-90.
41. Id. at 3697-3710.
42. Id. at 3728-41.
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976).
44. Government and official immunity has frequently been discussed because
litigants are often estopped from seeking redress for perceived wrongs committed by
government or public officials. See Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitu-
tional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. REv. 526 (1977), where
Professor Freed concludes "that immunity from liability for any public official is in-
tolerable in a free society." Id. at 565. He asserts that courts at the very least should
draw a line somewhere if not abandoning the immunities totally. A qualified immu-
nity, he concludes, would protect innocent officials while compensating victims of offi-
cial misfeasance and incompetence and deterring such conduct in the future. See also
Aibel, Federal Officers-Scope of Immunity from Damage Actions Available to Ad-
ministrative Agency Officials-Economou v. United States Department of Agricul-
ture, 30 RuT. L. REv. 209 (1976).
[Vol. 20
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action as relief. Realizing that government was getting more
and more complex, and that private legislation was affordable
only to the well-to-do, Congress enacted the FTCA.45
The FTCA embodies a general waiver of the immunity
privilege of the government for liability in tort. Two sections,
1346(b) and 2674, waive governmental immunity. Section
1346(b) provides, in part:
the district courts ... shall have jurisdiction of civil ac-
tions on claims against the United States, for money
damages, accruing on or after January 1, 1945, for injury
or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office of employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person would be liable to the
claimant, in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred. 46
Section 2674 states:
The United States shall be liable, respecting the pro-
visions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for inter-
est prior to judgement or for punitive damages. 7
Section 2680 includes several relevant exceptions to the
general rules cited above. First, it stipulates that the govern-
ment will not be liable for acts done with due care "in the
execution of a regulation or statute, whether or not such stat-
ute or regulation be valid," or for acts or omissions that are
within the realm of "discretionary function or duty" of any
federal agency or employee.' 8 Second, claims arising out of
45. The private claim bill, as the private legislation was called, numbered in the
thousands. From the 68th Congress through the 78th the claim bills averaged around
2000 per session. For example, 593 out of 1829 private claim bills introduced in the
77th Congress were approved. Total damages awarded for these 593 claims were
$1,000,253.30. Note that this was during World War II. Before the War, settled claims
of $2-3 million were not unusual. Often total claims introduced exceeded $100 mil-
lion. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 n.9 (1953).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976) (emphasis added).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) states:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall
not apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
19801
922 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
misrepresentation and interference with contract rights are
also estopped. 49 Finally, the section bars "any claim for dam-
ages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the
regulation of the monetary system."' 0
As applied to bank examination and regulation, the
FTCA is subject to varying interpretations. Nevertheless, in a
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regula-
tion, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon
the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an em-
ployee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent trans-
mission of letters or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of
any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise
by any officer of customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752,
781-790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the
United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of
the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title
50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establish-
ment of a quarantine by the United States.
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, mis-
representation, deceit, or interference with contract rights: Provided,
That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforce-
ment officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this
chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising,
on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious
prosecution. For the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law en-
forcement officer" means any officer of the United States who is empow-
ered by law to execute searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for
violations of Federal law.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the
Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system.
(0) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military
or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley
Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal
Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a
Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for cooperatives.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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great majority of cases, two of the section 2680 liability ex-
emptions, subsections (a) and (h),'1 have been used to provide
the government and its agents immunity from tort actions.
Section 2680 (i), relating to "regulation of the monetary sys-
tem," has rarely been used in bank examination and regula-
tion cases. Where it has been used to defend against tort lia-
bility, the courts have tersely noted its inapplicability.52
Cases involving discretion and assumption of duty. A
key inquiry in any FTCA tort claim is whether the com-
plained of action or omission was a discretionary act. Dalehite
v. United States" is one of the leading cases in this area.
Dalehite arose on claims alleging negligence by govern-
ment officials in planning and implementing a fertilizer export
program. By failing to notify all concerned of the potentially
great danger of the chemicals involved, plaintiffs contended
the government should be liable for the deaths in the explo-
sion that nearly destroyed Texas City, Texas. The Supreme
Court, finding governmental immunity by section 2680(a),
made a thorough exploration of the intent of the FTCA.
The Court found that the FTCA culminated eighty-five
years of "steady encroachment upon the originally unbroken
domain of sovereign immunity from legal process for the de-
licts of its agents."" The Court also found that the section
2680(a) exemption from liability was drafted to "assure pro-
tection for the Government against tort liability for errors in
administration or in exercise of discretionary functions."'
The Court quoted extensively the testimony of an Assistant
Attorney General who appeared before Congress to explain
the exemption. The exception precludes, he explained,
"any possibility that the act may be construed to author-
ize damage suits against the Government growing out of a
legally authorized activity," merely because "the same
conduct by a private individual would be tortious." It was
not "intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the
legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary
act, should be tested through the medium of a damage
51. See note 48 supra.
52. See In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation, 445 F. Supp. 723,
734 (E.D.N.Y.), a/I'd, supplemental opinion, 449 F. Supp. 574 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
53. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
54. Id. at 25 n.10.
55. Id. at 26-27.
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suit for tort."'
The witness also explained that although previous bills did
not contain the "discretionary function" exception, it would
have been exempted by judicial construction. "'It is not prob-
able that the courts would extend a Torts Claims Act into the
realm of the validity of legislation or discretionary administra-
tive action . . . ., Hence, "it was not contemplated that
the Government should be subject to liability arising from
acts of a governmental nature or function.""
Having analyzed the intent and nature of the section
2680(a) exception, the Court ruled on the specifics of the case.
The Court looked to the committee reports on the original
bill, finding that the intent of section 2680(a) "is to preclude
action for 'abuse of discretionary authority . . . whether or
not negligence is alleged to have been involved.' "" Thus,
while liability will exist if a government agent negligently
causes a car collision, the same employee will not incur liabil-
ity for negligence in performing a discretionary act within the
scope of his governmental authority.
The Court in Dalehite held that it was unnecessary to de-
fine exactly where discretion ended. Discretionary duty or
function, in the case of establishing and implementing a fertil-
izer program included not only initiation of programs and ac-
tivities, it also included
determinations made by executives or administrators in
establishing plans, specifications or schedules of opera-
tions. Where there is room for policy judgment and deci-
sion there is discretion."
The Court further stated that subordinates operating in ac-
cordance with official government directives are also immune.
The Dalehite ruling has served to foreclose many tort actions
against the government. Several subsequent cases have carved
distinctions from Dalehite. For example, with respect to low
level administrators (in bank insolvency cases the crucial deci-
sions at issue are made at high levels of administration), the
56. Id. at 27 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6493 Before the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2nd Ses. 6 (1941)).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 28.
59. Id. at 33.
60. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added).
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Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the ad-
ministrators, individually, do not require the same protection
of absolute immunity as do legislators, judges, and high level
administrators. Rather, a defense of "qualified good faith, rea-
sonable grounds" immunity is available. 1
A second important case, Indian Towing Co. v. United
States," distinguishes from Dalehite the situation where a
regulatory or governmental agency participates so actively or
extensively in its regulated domain that it engenders reliance
by the the public or those regulated. This constitutes an as-
sumption of duty theory.
In Indian Towing, plaintiffs alleged that because the
Coast Guard was negligent in maintaining a lighthouse, it
should be liable for damages incurred when one of Indian
Towing Company's tugs went aground in the area served by
the light. The government and lower courts looked to the
FTCA exemptions and to Dalehite for the answer in denying
the plaintiff's claim." Rather than "discretionary function,"
the issue in Indian Towing was whether there is liability for
assumption of duty and "for negligent performance of
'uniquely governmental functions.' "64
The Supreme Court first found that "all Government ac-
tivity is inescapably 'uniquely governmental' in that it is per-
formed by the Government." '  However, the Court also held
that it was not the intent of Congress
to draw distinctions so finespun and capricious as to be
almost incapable of being held in the mind for adequate
61. Economou v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688 (2nd Cir.
1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977). An appeal of a dismissal by plaintiffs, the
case originated as a suit by a registered commodity futures merchant against the
Dep't of Agriculture and its agents for initiating a wrongful administrative proceeding
against the merchant. With respect to the individual agents, the court first noted that
the concept of absolute immunity for administrative officials was clouded and hinged
on "distinctions in the character of their respective functions." Id. at 695. Lower level
administrators may "avail themselves of the defense of qualified 'good faith, reason-
able grounds immunity,"' which the court felt was the general trend in cases of this
sort. Id. at 696. Thus, subordinate officials, at least in the Second Circuit, must de-
fend tort suits by "demonstrating the reasonableness of their actions, buttressed by
affidavits of good faith." Id. See also Aibel, supra note 44.
62. 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
63. Id. at 64.
64. Id. The issue of governmental functions appears in Dalehite as a subissue,
see text accompanying note 58 supra.
65. Id. at 67.
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formulation. .. .[I]t is hard to think of any governmen-
tal activity which is 'uniquely government,' in the sense
that its kind has not at one time or another been, or could
not conceivably be, privately performed."
Hence, to deny liability for negligence in uniquely governmen-
tal functions would be tantamount to the Court's importing
immunity back into legislation designed to limit it.
The Court held the Coast Guard liable on the grounds
that while it had discretion in deciding whether to build and
operate a lighthouse or not, once it decided to operate the
lighthouse it was obligated to use due care to keep the facility
in proper working order.67
Dissenting Justices Reed, Barton, Clark, and Minton ob-
served that the "overall impression from the majority opinion
is that it makes the Government liable under the Act [FTCA]
for negligence in the conduct of any governmental activity on
the 'operational level."'" The Justices felt that the holdings
and dicta of the case were too broad as they could conceivably
extend to almost all governmental activities.
In the few (mostly recent) cases where insurers, borrow-
ers, directors, or shareholders connected with insolvent depos-
itory institutions have sought to hold government examiners
and regulators liable for tortious acts or omissions, Dalehite
and Indian Towing have played important roles. As discussed
below, courts have usually held examiners and regulators im-
mune in tort claims, "absent clear evidence of grossly arbi-
trary or capricious action . . . ."9 or assumption of duty.
These decisions will be explored.
Following a discussion of these decisions, a recent Illinois
case, Tcherepnin v. Franz,7 0 that imposed a qualified immu-
nity for state regulatory officers71 in a savings and loan associ-
66. Id. at 68.
67. Id. at 69.
68. Id. at 76.
69. In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litigation, 445 F. Supp. 723, 734
(1978), affd, supplemental opinion, 449 F. Supp. 574 (1978).
70. 570 F.2d 187 (1978).
71. Some states, e.g., Arizona, have totally eliminated the concept of sovereign
immunity for tort liability. Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d
107 (1963); State of Arizona v. Superior Court, 123 Ariz. 324, 599 P.2d 777 (1979). In
the latter case, the Arizona Supreme Court found that pleadings alleging fraud and
conspiracy by state officials did not adequately state'claims for which relief can be
granted. The Officials' actions were supposed to have helped two thrift associations
fail and cause the loss of much money to investors. The court noted that because
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ation case, will be analyzed in suggesting reform. The Illinois
standard may well be the next step in the century-long pro-
cess of encroachment upon sovereign immunity. Such strongly
qualified immunity may be warranted, especially in bank reg-
ulation where Congress itself has found a great deal of error
and negligence.7 The 1974 failure of the Franklin National
Bank, a $5 billion institution, offers a prime example of the
problems which such negligent regulation can produce.
Franklin National Bank
On October 8, 1974, the Comptroller of the Currency,
James E. Smith, declared Franklin National Bank, a $5
billion international bank ranked 19th in the Nation, to
be insolvent. This insolvency declaration established
Franklin as the largest bank failure in U.S. history and
brought to a conclusion half a decade of financial mis-
management and regulatory neglect.78
Thus begins a highly critical report entitled Adequacy of the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency's Supervision of
Franklin National Bank. The House Committee on Govern-
ment Operations that made the study concluded that the
OCC had seriously bungled its job. The Committee reached
several important conclusions including that the OCC failed
to utilize fully its supervisory options to correct problems un-
covered by examiners. 4 Although examiners ascertained most
Arizona had eliminated immunity for tort liability, a simple negligence allegation
would have been sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
72. See generally notes 1-4, 9, 10, and 17 supra; Failure of the U.S. National
Bank of San Diego: Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Insurance, House of Reps.,
93d Cong., 2d Seas. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Failure]; The Failure of Citizens
State Bank of Carrizo Springs, Texas and Related Problems, Parts 1 & 2, Subcomm.
on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance, 94th Cong., 2d
Seas. (1977). The apparent deficiencies of the examination process were noted by
Rep. St. Germain in the Carrizo Springs hearings. He poignantly pointed out that
"[o]f the 56 banks that failed in the United States between 1959 and 1971, 34 had
passed their most recent examination in a 'no problem' category, and 17 out of the 34
had been given an 'excellent' rating." Id. at 2.
73. COMM. ON GoVERNMENTAL OPERTIONS, supra note 2, at 1.
74. Id. at 6. Franklin's troubled status first became apparent when, after one of
its rare examinations, the OCC rated the Bank's condition a 3 on a scale of 1 to 4 (1
being best; 3 and 4 requiring special attention). However, not only did the OCC not
pay special attention, it also failed to fully utilize its corrective powers. Id. at 14. For
example, special one day visitations to review Franklin's foreign exchange operations
(where many of its problems lurked) were insufficient to make an adequate evaluation
of these operations. Id. at 17. Also, the OCC failed to use cease and desist powers, it
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of Franklin National Bank's (hereinafter Franklin or the
Bank) problems, these were inadequately pointed out to
Franklin or the regulators. 8
There was strong evidence in May 1974 that Franklin
could not survive as a viable independent entity. Conse-
quently, there is serious debate as to the propriety of the
Comptroller's decision at that time to declare the bank sol-
vent.7 ' The Comptroller's declaration allowed other banking
agencies to engage in costly and ultimately fruitless efforts to
save the bank.7 The OCC is required by federal law to ex-
amine a bank twice yearly, but for good cause may reduce ex-
aminations to no less than three in two years 8 but
[t]he OCC failed to conduct the required number of ex-
aminations of Franklin during the crucial years of 1969
through 1971 when some of the banking practices which
later proved fatal to Franklin were in full use.7 '
The OCC did not satisfactorily document why it deliberately
skipped required examinations."0 Finally, the Committee criti-
approved 17 new branch offices after Franklin's capital impairment became evident,
and even approved of the Bank's merger/take-over of a competing bank-all while
failing to enforce unmet conditions precedent to approval (e.g., for the merger the
OCC ordered Franklin to raise $20 million of capital but it never did-the OCC fol-
lowed up its order). Id. at 16-23.
75. Id.
76. The Committee reported that:
in declaring a bank insolvent, the Controller is not required to wait until
the losses he finds in a bank's assets are actually charged against its
book equity capital. The Controller's duty is to determine when a bank
has reached the point that it will not be able to meet its obligations to
its depositors in the near future .... Franklin would have reached that
point many months before [October 1974] without the aid of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York. Thus, it is clear that while Franklin did not
actually become insolvent, its solvency was due only to Federal Reserve
Bank funds borrowed on a daily basis from May 10 to October 8, 1974.
Id. at 24. Furthermore, it found that
An OCC examiner familiar with Franklin is alleged to have indicated
over the weekend of May 2, 1974, that the bank would no longer be a
viable institution after the bank opened on May 13, 1974. This same
sentiment was repeated by the Regional Administrator at a meeting
with Federal Reserve Bank of New York officials on May 10, 1974. Nev-
ertheless, the Comptroller certified that Franklin was solvent and a via-
ble going concern as of the week of May 14, 1974.
Id. at 35-36.
77. Id. at 6.
78. 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1976).
79. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIoNS, supra note 2, at 1.
80. Id. The Committee found that
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cized the Federal Reserve System for violating its own policies
with regard to extending credit to troubled banks.81 As for the
OCC's overall accountability, the Committee found that the
OCC was "lax in enforcing bank agreements and commit-
ments to improve soundness" and that even in large bank fail-
ures-involving "huge Federal Reserve loans, large stock-
holder and even depositor losses, major market disruptions,
etc.-the bank regulators are no more accountable to the Con-
gress than under normal day-to-day regulatory operations." 82
Given the OCC's related agencies' independence from direct
supervision and the congressional findings of neglect of minis-
terial or statutory duty and lax enforcement of regulations, a
strong argument can be mustered that liability for the failure
should attach.
The Comptroller did not observe the statutorily required examination
frequency in regards to Franklin, and, in addition, ignored the formal
statutory waiver provisions. From 1969-71 only three reports of exami-
nation were prepared on Franklin. Furthermore, from 1969 through
1973, the Comptroller also failed specifically to waive any examination
of the bank although he did not conduct at least two examinations per
calendar year.
... The Comptroller's response that the statutory requirements are
unduly burdensome cannot be justified in the case of Franklin. The re-
ported condition of Franklin certainly would have justified meeting or
exceeding the statutory required number of examinations. If the Comp-
troller believed the statute too burdensome and imprecise, he should
have requested Congress to amend it accordingly.
Id. at 12-13.
81. Id. at 6. The Committee also found that:
It is not the Federal Reserve's practice or policy to rely on the sale of
the loan collateral, with its attenuate uncertainties and delays, to re-
cover the funds it advances. When the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York asked how Franklin could repay loans from the Federal Reserve,
necessary to Franklin's survival, the bank's senior management replied
"there was no way to repay it." The Federal Reserve pursued the cha-
rade to justify making a loan to Franklin and insisted that Franklin's
officers "give us your ideas any [sic) on how to pay us back." Franklin's
president said that any response would have been little more than a
"comic letter." Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York
loaned an unprecedented $1.7 billion to Franklin.
Id. at 35.
82. Id. at 7. While Congress is the ultimate watchdog over the regulators, such
supervision is extremely loose due to its very nature: Congress doesn't have the ex-
pertise, manpower, nor interest to constantly supervise the bank agencies. Adding to
the agencies' independence is the fact that they derive all of their funding from the
banks they regulate-Congress cannot pull financial strings to control the agencies.
This argues strongly for allowing greater judicial review and limitation of the discre-
tion rules of the FTCA exceptions.
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Much litigation followed FNB's failure; two cases were
preeminent: In re Franklin National Bank Securities Litiga-
tion83 and Huntington Tower, Ltd. v. Franklin National
Bank." The two cases will be discussed jointly.
FNB Securities was a consolidation of several cases origi-
nally generated by the FDIC's suit against several insurersa
supplying Bankers' Blanket Bonds.8e Other actions targeted
Franklin's auditor, Ernst & Ernst, and Continental Bank In-
ternational (Continental). Many of the parties initiated third-
party complaints against the United States and cross- and
counter-claims against each other, creating a very complex
case.
The insurance companies in their third-party complaints
against the United States basically alleged that government
bank examiners and regulators were negligent, thereby con-
tributing to Franklin's losses. Continental and Ernst & Ernst
made similar allegations in their defenses and cross-claims.
The insurers also suggested that the government, through its
bank regulatory agencies, overstepped its normal regulatory
functions and actually participated in the management of
Franklin. By so doing, it was argued, the government should
be liable for some losses under the Indian Towing theory of
assumption of duty. The government sought to end the action
quickly by moving to dismiss the counter-charges on the
grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The District Court for the Eastern District of New York
held, and subsequently affirmed its holding, that: 1) the
United States owed no duty to the Bank by virtue of statutes
requiring government agencies to examine and regulate banks;
2) by regulating a bank, the government usually did not as-
sume a duty to the bank such that negligent regulation could
give rise to tort liability; 3) a cause of action was stated in a
complaint alleging governmental assumption of duty by ex-
83. 445 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, supplemental opinion, 449 F. Supp. 574
(E.D.N.Y. 1978).
84. 559 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
85. National Surety Corporation, Fireman's Fund Insurance Company, the
Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, and the Insurance Company of North America.
86. These bonds insured Franklin and its parent company, Franklin New York
Corporation, against the losses perpetrated through dishonesty or fraud by the em-
ployees of either firm.
930 [Vol. 20
BANK INSOLVENCY
ceeding normal regulatory activities; and 4) by suing, the
FDIC did not waive sovereign immunity.
The district court bisected its discussion of governmental
duty into statutory duty and assumption of duty."' With re-
spect to statutory duty the insurance companies principally
asserted that the OCC had failed to fulfill its statutory obliga-
tions under section 481 of Title XII of the United States Code
that requires examiners to examine every national bank at
least twice annually.88 Section 481 also states that the Comp-
troller, at his discretion, may waive examinations, but not
more than one examination in any two year period. Finally,
the examiners are required to make a "full and detailed report
of the condition of said bank to the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency . . . ."" The insurance companies alleged, and as dis-
cussed above, congressional hearings subsequently revealed,
that the OCC and examiners "conducted these bank examina-
tions negligently and thus caused the losses at FNB by failing
to discover wrongdoing by the FNB employees." 9 Complain-
ants also alleged that the government negligently failed to act
and use its statutory powers with respect to facts it did know
about the Bank. The insurance companies argued that such
negligence gives rise to liability because statutes giving the
United States regulatory authority impose a duty in favor of
the banks under federal regulation.
It is indicative of the lack of authority in this area that
the main cases discussed in the court's opinion, Harmsen v.
Smith"1 and Kaufman v. Evans" were being argued simulta-
neously. The California district court opinion in Harmsen
came down before FNB Securities. The Harmsen appellate
decision affirming the district court's decision came down af-
ter FNB Securities. The FNB Securities court agreed with
the courts in Kaufman and Harmsen that the examinations
are "not intended to create an actionable duty to the ex-
amined banks."93 The FNB Securities court interpreted the
87. 445 F. Supp. at 730-34.
88. 12 U.S.C. § 481 (1976).
89. Id.
90. 445 F. Supp. at 730.
91. Civil Nos. 73-480-E, 74-345-E (S.D. Cal. July 28, 1975). An appeal subse-
quently affirmed the lower court's decision, Harmsen v. Smith, 586 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.
1978).
92. Civ. No. 127-71 (D.N.J. July 21, 1977).
93. 445 F. Supp. at 730.
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reasoning of the other courts as indicating that the statutes
requiring examinations were primarily designed to assist the
regulators in regulating. It admitted that incidental benefits
accrue to the banks under such a scheme. However, absent a
clearer Congressional expression of intent, the FNB Securities
court felt it would be foolish to read into the statute protec-
tion of shareholders, officers, or directors by the government.
As such, then, the statute imposed no duty on the government
vis d vis those parties."
Noting that FTCA section 1346(b) allows liability only if
it is based on "the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred," 95 the parties and court utilized New York law that
recognizes an assumption of duty theory of liability." Some of
the insurance companies argued that regulation is an assump-
tion of duty such that negligent regulation gives rise to tort
liability. This issue can be bifurcated. The first question is
whether assumption of duty can be found in normal day-to-
day examination and regulation. The second is whether as-
sumption of duty exists when, as alleged in the cases the gov-
ernment over-regulates and becomes involved in the operation
of the bank.
With regard to the first question mentioned above, the
FNB Securities court, relying on the district court opinion in
Harmsen, held that the United States owed no duty to the
banks by examining and regulating them. Harmsen distin-
guished Indian Towing and related cases.97 In Harmsen, the
district court ruled that the crucial difference or test is the
purpose for which such task is performed. 8 In Indian Towing,
94. Id. at 731.
95. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
96. 445 F. Supp. at 731 (1978). The court explained the assumption of duty
theory as follows: "Some of the Insurance Companies argue that even if there is no
statutory duty, the Government's involvement in the operation of FNB was so exten-
sive that it was reasonable for the bank and its directors, officers and shareholders to
rely on the United States to protect against fraud, and thus the United States
thereby assumed a duty to these parties." Id.
97. See, e.g., Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967). In this case the court ruled that victims of a crash, which
resulted from the negligent failure of a Federal Aviation Agency approach controller
to warn incoming aircraft of lessened visibility, were entitled to damages. The court
stated that "[i]t is now well established that when the government undertakes to
perform services, which in the absence of specific legislation would not be required, it
will, nevertheless, be liable if these activities are performed negligently." Id. 236.
98. The court of appeals upheld the decision of the district court that the
Comptroller owed no duty to the shareholders or to the directors of USNB. The court
932 [Vol. 20
BANK INSOLVENCY
the lighthouse existed to warn the public. However, the exam-
inations the OCC is required to make are designed essentially
to aid the government in regulating the banks, not to provide
the banks with warnings or service. Ergo, the examinations
are not intended to engender reliance by the banks, nor does
the government assume any duty by its actions.
The court in FNB Securities found that the second prong
of the assumption of duty theory was actionable. "[I]f the ac-
tivities of the Government were so extensive that the directors
or officers reasonably relied on the government to prevent
fraud, then the United States could be held liable .... "'
Underlying and potentially estopping the liability are the no-
tions of the FTCA exceptions under section 2680. In analyzing
this, issue, the FNB Securities court first turned to the court
of appeals' opinion in Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin
National Bank.100
Huntington Towers was a borrower's suit brought by real
estate developers who sought to recover a loss of $8 million
suffered because of the failure of Franklin. The plaintiffs al-
leged that more than $3 million of their losses stemmed di-
rectly from the late declaration of the Bank's insolvency. It
was during the period from May 13, 1974 to October 8, 1974
when the FRB made large loans to Franklin that the plaintiffs
gave $3 million in additional security for their loans. Thus,
the developers argued, but for the improper actions of the
government agencies, the losses would not have occurred be-
cause Franklin was insolvent in May 1974.
The essence of the developers' first claim against the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank was that it should not have supported
Franklin in light of its "hopeless financial situation through-
out that period and that failure to disclose the insolvency to
wrote: "All that the Comptroller did was to perform his statutory duty of examina-
tion. In performing those statutory tasks, the Comptroller assumes no special rela-
tionship to the stockholders or to the directors who claim reliance on the results of
the examination." 586 F.2d at 158.
99. 445 F. Supp. at 733. The conclusion was deduced from the dicta of Social
Security Administration Baltimore Federal Credit Union v. United States, 138 F.
Supp. 639 (D. Md. 1956). The case, which is the foundation for the Harmsen opinion,
entailed a FTCA action by a federal credit union against the government on the
grounds that the government had been negligent in examining the credit union's
records. The court in SSA Credit Union held that it was the duty of the credit union
itself (primarily its accountants) to detect internal fraud. The government had no
statutory duty and assumed no duty in this regard.
100. 559 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1977).
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appellants constituted an actionable tort."10' 1 The court rea-
soned that "[a]bsent clear evidence of grossly arbitrary or ca-
pricious action on the part of either [the OCC or the FRB],"
the fixing of the date of insolvency and the decision to sup-
port Franklin with FRB funds were within the realm of the
agency's discretion.10' No evidence of grossly arbitrary or ca-
pricious action was presented. The court commented that:
It is not for the courts to say whether or not the actions
taken were justified in the public interest, particularly
where it virtually concerned the operation and stability of
the nation's banking system .... In short, the FRB...
was doing, for better or worse, what Congress expected it
to do .... o0
Interestingly, the court in Huntington Towers dismissed the
plaintiff's claim on the grounds of "lack of subject matter ju-
risdiction" and not the FTCA "discretion" exemptions.'"
Additionally, the plaintiffs in Huntington Towers claimed
that the Comptroller should be liable individually and offi-
cially because:
(1) he failed to declare an insolvent bank insolvent; (2) he
declared an insolvent bank solvent; (3) he kept an insol-
vent bank open; (4) he consented to an unlawful prefer-
ence among creditors in violation of 12 U.S.C. §194; and
(5) he failed to take action to have ... preferential liens
declared null and void. 105
Citing Hawaii v. Gordon'"e and Dalehite the court suggested
that section 2680(a) relating to discretionary functions pre-
cluded the claim.
In FNB Securities, the court cited as one possible source
of liability the Huntington Towers test of "clear evidence of
101. Id. at 867.
102. Id. at 868 (emphasis added). But see note 114 infra.
103. Id.
104. Ostensibly, the holding was based on several old cases. Id. at 868-69. In
FNB Securities the court read the dismissal as being based "apparently on the
ground that as long as the FRB acted within its statutory authorization, the decisions
of the FRB are immune from judicial scrutiny." 445 F. Supp. at 733.
105. 559 F.2d at 869.
106. 373 U.S. 57 (1963). The case entailed a suit by the State of Hawaii against
the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The court held the case was one against the
United States and as such could not be maintained without the consent of the United
States.
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grossly arbitrary or capricious action. 1 07 The insurance com-
pany strongly asserted that the government's actions with re-
gard to Franklin met this test. On the basis of these asser-
tions, the court denied a motion to dismiss.
The government in FNB Securities tried to use the
FTCA exceptions to foreclose the insurance companies'
claims. Relying on section 2680(h) and United States v. Neu-
stadt,1' 0 the government argued that while its actions were
willful, they still fell within the Neustadt standard which in-
cludes both negligent and willful misrepresentation under the
section 2680(h) exception. Thus, claimed the government,
their actions were exempted from FTCA liability. The court
disagreed, quoting United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener:109
Here, the gravamen of the action is not misrepresentation
but the negligent performance of operational tasks, al-
though such negligence consisted partly of a failure of a
duty to warn.110
Thus, under these circumstances, section 2680(h) does not
protect the government. However, the court went on to point
out that it had held that the OCC, FDIC, and FRB held no
duty to the bank even for negligent regulation, thus the ques-
tion was moot.
Finally, the United States sought to invoke the section
2680(a) "discretionary function" exception."' The court re-
futed the government's argument by making an analogy based
on Indian Towing:
By analogy, while the chartering of a national bank
by the United States is a discretionary decision exempt
107. 559 F.2d at 868.
108. 366 U.S. 696 (1961). Neustadt was a suit brought under the FTCA against
the United States by purchasers of residential property seeking to recover the differ-
ence between the purchase price of the property and its fair market value alleging
that they would not have purchased the property if they had not relied on a negligent
inspection and appraisal made by the Federal Housing Administration. The Court
held that the plaintiffs' claims were based on negligent misrepresentation which is
not actionable under section 2680(h). The section 2680(h) exception for misrepresen-
tation includes both willful and negligent actions the Court concluded.
109. 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). The case in-
volved 31 claims arising out of a mid-air collision between an Air Force fighter and a
commercial airliner. The court held that the United States was liable because the Air
Force was negligent and thus must indemnify the airline. The suit was not precluded
by the FTCA exceptions.
110. 335 F.2d at 398.
111. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976).
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from scrutiny [similar to the Coast Guard's decision
whether or not to build a lighthouse], as is the fixing of
the date of declaration of insolvency, however, once hav-
ing taken control of a bank, as it is alleged to have done
here, it could not operate it in a negligent manner without
being subject to liability.11'
In other words, once the government exceeded its normal
function and basically managed the bank, it stepped into the
shoes of the directors and was held to the same standards as
they were. In a sense, the court implies that when the govern-
ment exceeds or abuses its discretionary power, it cannot use
the FTCA exception as a shield.
What finally emerges is a doctrine of mildly qualified im-
munity for federal agents and agencies. As the courts point
out, there are potentially two sources of liability on these
facts. First, a case may be based on a theory of assumption of
duty where the regulators have exceeded their legal powers
and have actually participated in the operation of the bank.
Second, a case may be built on grounds of grossly arbitrary or
capricious actions by federal regulators.
The New York district court in FNB Securities depended
heavily on the analysis and holding of the California district
court in Harmsen. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals deci-
sion in Harmsen v. Smith," s in turn, repeatedly cited FNB
Securities. Despite this inherent weakness, Harmsen does
merit inspection as it addresses some questions not raised in
the Franklin Bank cases.
United States National Bank
Harmsen v. Smith arose from the failure of the U.S. Na-
tional Bank of San Diego.114 While factually the failures of
Franklin and U.S. National Bank differed,"' the pattern of
112. 445 F. Supp. at 735.
113. 586 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1978).
114. Another case, First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 572 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 919 (1978), involved the bank regulatory process in terms of dispos-
ing of an insolvent bank's assets by the FDIC. Creditors sued the FDIC alleging that
their claims to San Diego had been improperly disposed of and that, as such, the
FDIC should be liable. Finding the FDIC had erred in its handling of the bank, the
Court of Appeals held that the FDIC had the responsibility to compensate creditors
for its failure.
115. Franklin failed because of fraud and excessive losses in its foreign currency
and real estate divisions. U.S. National Bank failed primarily because of a loan pyra-
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regulatory neglect and abuse was similar.
When it failed on October 18, 1973, U.S. National Bank
was among the 100 largest banks in the country with total as-
sets exceeding $1.2 billion. As early as 1962, the problems that
ultimately caused the bank to fail were known to examin-
ers."" Had action been taken to stop the loans to corporations
controlled by C. Arnholt Smith, Chairman of U.S. National
Bank, the bank might have been saved. 11 7 The examiner who
discovered the discrepancies, however, was reprimanded and
taken off the case by the Comptroller of the Currency. '1 8 Fur-
thermore, the OCC stood by and allowed the unsound bank-
ing practices at the bank to continue for the next ten years.11
In Harmsen, the court addressed the "novel" question
whether directors of a defunct national bank may main-
tain actions for indemnity against the United States for
alleged negligence of the Comptroller of the Currency in
conducting bank examinations.120
The case had originated as a shareholder class action suit
against the directors for various breaches of fiduciary duty.
The FDIC intervened, acting as the bank's receiver, on behalf
of the shareholders. The directors thereafter filed third-party
complaints seeking indemnity under the FTCA.
The directors' complaints alleged that the OCC "was neg-
ligent in performing bank examinations, in supervising em-
ployees who performed the examinations, and in failing to dis-
cover illegal or unsound banking practices of USNB." 11 To
support the directors' argument for equitable indemnity, the
court required the showing of a duty owed the original plain-
tiff (the bank's shareholders) by the United States. ' Citing
mid scheme run by its Chairman of the Board, C. Arnholt Smith. In the scheme a
series of companies controlled by Smith, including the San Diego Padres baseball
team, shifted their books and assets in order to get hundreds of millions of dollars in
loans and loan guarantees from the bank. The loans far exceeded the legal lending
limits of the bank. Ultimately, the loans based on and secured by sham assets so
impaired U.S. National Bank's capital structure that the bank was declared insolvent.
See generally Failure, note 72 supra.
116. See testimony of Jack Baker, id. at 161.
117. Id. at 162.
118. Id. at 162-63.
119. Id.
120. 586 F.2d at 156.
121. Id. at 157.
122. The district court also required a showing "that the negligence of the origi-
nal defendant was of a different character than that of the party from whom indem-
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FNB Securities, the court found there is no "duty on the
Comptroller to protect shareholders [and that] [n]othing in
the statutory scheme suggests that any such duty should be
implied."' ' The Harmsen court appears not to have totally
perceived the implications of the ruling and language of FNB
Securities. It is conceivable, in New York and the Second Cir-
cuit, that the government might regulate in such a manner
that it negligently assumed duties running to the bank by ei-
ther engaging in grossly arbitrary and capricious actions or by
participating beyond the scope of its statutory powers. It is
not clear under Harmsen in California if this "negligent as-
sumption of duty" theory could exist. Since the case involved
mere fulfillment by the Comptroller of his statutory duties,
the court did not address the question of more flagrant gov-
ernmental actions.
In response to the directors' contention that submission
of the OCC's examination reports to them engendered reli-
ance, the court attempted to distinguish the Indian Towing
case. The court asserted that bank examination bore no re-
semblance to the Coast Guard's duties to maintain light-
houses stating, "Bank examinations are not beacons to light
the path of erring directors or gulled stockholders. 1 2 4 The
court admitted arguendo however, that it is possible that a
case could occur where the OCC so heavily participated in
management of a bank that the conduct created a duty to the
bank and its shareholders.
Finally, the court refuted the directors' arguments, based
on a series of early cases,125 that among the purposes of fed-
eral banking regulation was the protection of creditors and
depositors. The court posited that "from the fact of congres-
sional intent to protect creditors and depositors of national
banks, no inference arises of any congressional intent to pro-
tect stockholders and directors of national banks."12
Essentially, then, Harmsen rests on a lack of standing for
shareholders and directors. No matter how shoddy the gov-
nity was sought." Id. at 157 n.1. The court of appeals' decision on the first require-
ment allowed it to sidestep this issue.
123. Id. at 157.
124. Id. at 158.
125. Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220 (1903); Deitrick v. Standard Surety & Casu-
alty Co., 303 U.S. 471 (1938); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190 (1940).
126. 586 F.2d at 158 (emphasis added).
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ernment's actions, shareholders and directors have no cause of
action because no duty is owed them by bank regulators. The
Harmsen court did not even have to consider the discretion-
ary exception of the FTCA.
While the Franklin and U.S. National Bank have cir-
cumscribed the law in this area, courts in state jurisdictions
have generally found only a qualified immunity for bank regu-
lators, holding that such regulators do owe a duty to share-
holders of a depository institution' 2 7 The seemingly unending
litigation surrounding the 1964 collapse of a Chicago savings
and loan represents the leading case in the area of broad qual-
ification of official immunity-Tcherepnin v. Franz.128
City Savings Association of Chicago
The Illinois standards set forth in Franz""' basically ex-
tend the liability of depository institution regulators to depos-
itor/shareholdersO and qualify the immunity of public offi-
cials. Franz arose out of a claim by depositors of City Savings
Association of Chicago that several state officials, including
Joseph Knight (the later retired and deceased Director of the
Department of Financial Institutions), had breached their
statutory duties to City Savings. City Savings' receiver inter-
ceded, seeking to hold the officials and the State of Illinois
liable for damages to the depositors. The state settled, appro-
priating over $12 million for reimbursements to depositors.
The officials did not settle and district court subsequently
found against the estate of Joseph Knight. 181 The district
court found that Knight had maliciously breached a statutory
duty to supervise the affairs of City Savings" 2 and that he
127. See generally Tcherepnin v. Franz, 393 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1975),
afl'd, 570 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1978); Mills v. American Surety Co. of New York, 26
Idaho 652, 145 P. 1097 (1914); State v. Dixon, 80 Kan. 650, 103 P. 130 (1909); Pope
County v. Shelter, 318 Ill. App. 279, 47 N.E.2d 732 (1943). See also note 71 supra.
128. 393 F. Supp. 1197 (N.D. Il1. 1975), affd, 570 F.2d 187 (7th Cir. 1978).
129. 570 F.2d at 191.
130. As is the case with many savings institutions, depositors technically are
holders of withdrawable capital shares. Thus, one is both a depositor and shareholder
simultaneously. See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967) where the Court held
the depositor's interests to be securities for purposes of SEC regulation.
131. 393 F. Supp. at 1207-20.
132. Specifically, the district court found that Knight breached his statutory
duty to supervise CSA by intentionally ignoring or concealing examinations and by
delaying action for four months after he ascertained CSA's impaired financial condi-
tion. Id. at 1216.
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had either fraudulently or negligently participated in foisting
an illegal plan of voluntary liquidation upon its depositors.
On appeal, Knight's estate sought to invoke official im-
munity with respect to the district court's finding. The appel-
late court noted that, while under common law public officials
were immune from errors in discretion and judgment, this was
not true of Illinois and other jurisdictions. Citing an old Illi-
nois case,'"8 the court held that
the immunity conferred on public officials is a qualified
one, one that is displaced by an official's negligent con-
duct in the performance of ministerial duties or malicious
and corrupt conduct in the performance of discretionary
duties .... I
The essential inquiry of this "statutory violation theory,"
as the district court termed it, was ascertaining which parties
were owed what duties by the regulator. In this regard,
Knight, subject to the terms of the Illinois Savings and Loan
Act, was responsible for the "protection of the Association.
'135
This language was broad enough that City Savings and its de-
positors had "a vested right in the duties therein pre-
scribed."' 8 6 The court deemed such responsibility sufficient to
create liability. Knight was found to have been malicious and
willful in the dereliction of his duties. Such extreme conduct
might fit the "grossly arbitrary or capricious" test for liability
on the federal level. Note that Illinois law, as interpreted in
this case, extends liability against an official not only in his
official capacity, but personally as well-a significant qualifi-
cation of immunity.
Briefly, then, Illinois in the absence of the FTCA or simi-
lar act, has evolved a standard of strongly qualified immunity
for public officials. In depository failure cases the regulators
owe a duty to the institution as well as to creditors and depos-
itors. In a savings and loan situation, and perhaps in other
situations, a duty is owed the shareholders as well. Duty may
be breached and liability incurred by negligence in the per-
formance of ministerial functions. With discretionary func-
tions, duty is breached by corrupt and malicious conduct.
133. Munson v. Bartels, 138 Ill. 322, 27 N.E. 1091 (1891).
134. 570 F.2d at 191.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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Most importantly, with respect to the rights of shareholders
and other claimants, the lower standards of Illinois' qualified
immunity offers far greater protection.
Summary of Standards
At the federal level, the Franklin and U.S. National
Bank decisions helped establish the concept of mildly quali-
fied immunity of federal bank examiners and regulators. Note
that neither case made a determination for liability on the
facts presented; consequently, the concept is still theoretical.
Only two methods exist to circumvent FTCA immunity. First,
the assumption of duty theory may be invoked where the gov-
ernment actually participated in managing the affairs of the
bank. Second, liability may be implied where there is clear ev-
idence of gross arbitrary or capricious actions by the regula-
tors in the course of their duty. Underlying these exceptions is
the question of duty: what duty is required and to whom is it
owed? In the federal cases, creditors and depositors are owed
a duty of fairness and propriety by regulators. Shareholders
and directors of a bank, in other words, the banks themselves,
are left without recourse in cases of negligent government reg-
ulation and administration and less than grossly arbitrary or
capricious federal conduct.
In Illinois, shareholders and directors also have rights vis
vis regulators. The standard of immunity from tort action is
broadly qualified and may be displaced by an official's negli-
gent conduct in performing statutory duties or by malicious
and corrupt conduct in performing discretionary duties. Such
an official may be found liable personally as well as officially.
CONCLUSION
Traditional policy arguments appear to be strong for
maintaining almost absolute immunity for federal depository
institution examiners and regulators. One often reads or hears
that public policy dictates that we should protect those who
must act decisively in a sensitive and complex area such as
banking. Present trends, however, call for some rethinking of
this policy.
The primary issue is whether there should be a duty owed
to banks, shareholders, and directors. In Illinois, the courts
have read the laws on examination and supervision as being
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enacted for the protection of the depository institution. The
federal courts, however, as seen in SSA Credit Union,8 7
Harmsen, and the Franklin Bank cases, read the law as pro-
tecting only the public.
Even when there is a duty, the courts have granted signif-
icant immunity. For example, in distinguishing a recent case,
Economou' 88 the Huntington Towers court stated that the
breadth and character of the OCC's role required absolute im-
munity so that the OCC may work without the threat of su-
pervision and suit.' 89
These arguments, however, are flawed when viewed in
context. Banking is the subject of more and more regulation.
FIRA, passed recently, gives new powers and thus heightens
the potential for abuses by banking regulators. And this new
power was granted despite recent congressional investigations
that chronicled a history of OCC, FDIC, and FRB negligence
and malfeasance.
There is clear danger from abuse of power and negligence
by regulators. Consider, for example, $8 million in losses to
Franklin's borrowers and potentially millions lost to the
shareholders of U.S. National Bank. Given these facts and the
express congressional purpose of protecting the public and
maintaining a safe and sound banking system, it is logical to
impose more judicial supervision and review in these cases
and less absolute immunity.
As noted by this comment, one of the purposes of abso-
lute or mildly qualified immunity has been to encourage the
regulator to act decisively. Nonetheless, as the Franklin and
U.S. National Bank cases demonstrate, the regulators either
did not act or acted very slowly. A standard of strongly quali-
fied immunity, rather than shackling a regulator with fear of
liability, would encourage him to act reasonably and pru-
dently-ideals that are to the greatest public benefit. Stan-
dards of reasonableness can be applied to discretionary situa-
tions. It is time for Congress to look not at how the powers
and regulations have failed; but rather how to make its regu-
lators more accountable and efficient. To this purpose the
137. See note 99 supra.
138. 535 F.2d 688, cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977). See note 61 supra.
139. 559 F.2d at 870 n.2.
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enlightened Illinois perspective may find a useful federal
application.
Karl 0. Hartmann

